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EQUAL PROTECTION AND THE PUTATIVE FATHER: AN
ANALYSIS OF PARHAM v. HUGHES AND CABAN
v. MOHAMMED
by Sharon Nelson Freytag
At common law the father of an illegitimate child had no parental
rights' according to the doctrine of nulliusfilius, which characterized the
illegitimate child as no man's son.2 Reflecting this historical bias against a
putative father,3 state laws consistently treated him less favorably than
other parents with respect to the privileges of parenthood.4 An Oregon
adoption statute typified the traditional attitude toward the father of an
illegitimate child by providing: "The consent of the mother of the child is
sufficient. . . and for all purposes relating to the adoption of the child, the
father of the child shall be disregarded just as if he were dead . .. .,5
Most states have softened this rigid attitude by allowing putative fathers
limited rights with respect to their children.6 In addition, the United States
Supreme Court, by invalidating a state statute discriminating against puta-
tive fathers, has recognized a natural father's right to a hearing on his
fitness as a parent before being denied custody of his illegitimate children.
7
The decisions of Parham v. Hughes8 and Caban v. Mohammed 9 demon-
1. See Barron, Notice to the Unwed Father and Termination of Parental Rights Imple-
menting Stanley P. Illinois, in FATHERS, HUSBANDS AND LOVERS 95 (S. Katz & M. Inker eds.
1979). See also cases collected in Annot., 45 A.L.R.3d 216, 224-25 (1972).
2. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *485. But see Tabler, Paternal Rights in the
Illegitimate Child: Some Legitimate Complaints on Behalf of the Unwed Father, 11 J. FAM. L.
231, 235 (1971), who concludes that courts have often denied paternal rights in favor of the
mother of the child based on a mistaken interpretation of the common law under which the
mother was no more a parent than the father because a bastard was the child of no one.
3. Putative father is defined as "[tIhe alleged or reputed father of an illegitimate child."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1113 (5th ed. 1979). In this Comment "putative father" also
refers to a known father who has acknowledged the paternity of an illegitimate child.
4. For a listing of state statutes that affect the rights of putative fathers, see Comment,
Protecting the Putative Father's Rights After Stanley v. Illinois. Problems in Implementation,
13 J. FAM. L. 115, 138-47 (1973-1974). See generally Comment, The Emerging Constitutional
Protection of the Putative Father's Parental Rights, 70 MICH. L. REV. 1581 (1972).
5. OR. REV. STAT. § 109.326 (1969) (current version at OR. REV. STAT. § 109.094
(1977)). An Illinois decision further exemplified the historical attitude toward putative fa-
thers. Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 111. App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S.
945 (1964). In that opinion, an Illinois court held that fathering an illegitimate child was a
tort committed by the father upon the child.
6. See, e.g., note 26 infra. The 1977 version of the quoted Oregon statute suggests an
increased sensitivity to the putative father's plight. The statutory scheme now provides that
once paternity has been established, the natural father has the same rights as a father who is
or was married to the mother of the child. OR. REV. STAT. § 109.094 (1977). These rights
include consent to adoption. Id. § 109.312.
7. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); see notes 11-18 infra and accompanying text.
8. 441 U.S. 347 (1979).
9. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
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strate, however, the Court's uncertainty in the area of equal protection of
the putative father.
This Comment traces Supreme Court decisions involving a putative fa-
ther's rights,' 0 discusses the fluctuating equal protection standard of review
applied in sex discrimination cases, and focuses on the standards used and
the results achieved in Parham and Caban, both cases of alleged sex dis-
crimination brought by fathers of illegitimate children. Finally, this Com-
ment analyzes the possible effect of the decisions in Caban and Parham on
the Texas adoption and wrongful death statutes as they apply to the puta-
tive father.
I. EARLY DECISIONS AFFECTING THE PUTATIVE FATHER'S RIGHTS
The Supreme Court first confronted the issue of the custody rights of a
putative father in 1972 in Stanley v. Illinois. " For eighteen years, the peti-
tioner had lived intermittently with the mother of his three children, but
had never married her. When the mother died, the state of Illinois insti-
tuted dependency proceedings as a result of which the children were de-
clared wards of the state according to the provisions of the Illinois
statutes. 12 They were then placed in the custody of a married couple ap-
pointed as guardians by the court. 13 Stanley contended that he had been
deprived of equal protection. He argued that Illinois law required a show-
ing of unfitness before fathers of legitimate children and all mothers, even
if unwed, could be denied custody.14 Yet, the state need only show that a
father was not married to the mother before depriving him of his chil-
dren. 15 The Supreme Court, holding unconstitutional a presumption that
fathers of illegitimate children are unsuitable and neglectful parents, de-
10. The Supreme Court has not decided a case treating visitation rights per se of the
putative father; therefore, this Comment does not discuss visitation rights in depth, but fo-
cuses instead on the putative father's rights regarding custody, adoption, and wrongful death
actions. For a discussion of putative fathers' visitation rights, see Tabler, supra note 2, at
231-36. See also Schwartz, Rights of a Father with Regard to His Illegitimate Child, 36 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1, I1 (1975).
11. 405 U.S. 645 (1972). Before Stanley the courts in three states had granted a putative
father's claim, basing their decisions on preserving the family relationship or on furthering
the best interest of the child, but not on recognizing the rights of the putative father. See In
re Guardianship of Smith, 42 Cal. 2d 91, 265 P.2d 888 (1954); In re Mark T., 8 Mich. App.
122, 154 N.W.2d 27 (1967); In re Brennan, 270 Minn. 455, 134 N.W.2d 126 (1965). See also
Commonwealth v. Rozanski, 206 Pa. Super. Ct. 397, 213 A.2d 155 (1965), in which the
decision was based on the child's welfare, but a dissenting justice noted:
The grant of such [visitation] rights emphasizes and advertises to the commu-
nity in general the illegitimacy of the child to the child's detriment. It can, too,
by this sanction of the creation of legal rights in a putative father, encourage
the renewal of the meretricious relationship between the parties which cannot
possibly contribute to the welfare of the child.
213 A.2d at 159 (Watkins, J., dissenting).
12. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, §§ 701-14, 702-1, -5 (Smith-Hurd 1972).
13. In re Stanley, 45 111. 2d 132, 256 N.E.2d 814, 815 (1970).
14. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, §§ 702-1, -4 (Smith-Hurd 1972).
15. Under the statutory scheme, the state could circumvent neglect proceedings on the
theory that unwed fathers were not parents. Id. § 701-14 provides that "parents" means the
father and mother of a legitimate child or the natural mother of an illegitimate child.
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cided that both due process and equal protection required that Stanley be
given a hearing to determine his fitness before his children could be re-
moved from his custody.' 6 The Court concluded: "Stanley's interest in
retaining custody of his children [was] cognizable and substantial,"',7 and
this private interest "of a man in the children he has sired and raised, un-
deniably warrant[ed] deference and, absent a powerful countervailing in-
terest, protection. '' 1
The impact of the Court's holding immediately affected state judicial
and legislative actions. Following Stanley, the Supreme Court vacated
and remanded two cases, Vanderlaan v. Vanderlaan'9 and State ex rel.
Lewis v. Lutheran Social Services,20 for reconsideration in light of that de-
cision. In Vanderlaan a putative father had been denied the custody of his
illegitimate children, but on remand 2' the Illinois Supreme Court reversed
and granted the putative father custody based on the Stanley decision. In
Lewis a putative father challenged the adoption of his children that had
been arranged without his consent, but the Wisconsin Supreme Court orig-
inally held that only the mother had power to terminate parental rights
and to consent to the adoption of a child born out of wedlock.22 On re-
mand23 the Wisconsin court reversed its earlier decision and, based on
Stanley, held that an adoption could not be completed without either the
unwed father's consent or the termination of his parental rights. 24 Thus,
the court interpreted the decision in Stanley as applying to adoptions as
well as custody. The Stanley holding, however, caused confusion among
state adoption authorities over whether both known and unknown putative
fathers had to receive notice and the opportunity for a hearing25 before
16. The Court stated:
[Als a matter of due process of law, Stanley was entitled to a hearing on his
fitness as a parent before his children were taken from him and ... by deny-
ing him a hearing and extending it to all other parents whose custody of their
children is challenged, the State denied Stanley the equal protection of the
laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.
405 U.S. at 649.
Justice White's opinion focused primarily on a procedural due process analysis of the
statute's denial of a hearing. The due process issue, however, had not been raised in the
lower courts and thus posed jurisdictional problems, so the Court "grafted its due process
line of reasoning onto the petitioner's equal protection theory." Case Comment, Constitu-
tional Law-A Dependency Hearing Which Would Deny an Unwed Father Custody of His
Child on the Death of Its Mother Without Reference to the Father's Fitness as a Parent is
Violative of Due Process and Equal Protection, 4 Loy. Cmi. L.J. 176, 189 (1973); see Gins-
burg, Sex Equality and the Constitution, 52 TtUL. L. REV. 451, 459 (1978), who believes that
the Court avoided the equal protection issue that unwed fathers stand equal with all mothers
and wed fathers vis-A-vis child custody and took a "smaller step" by basing its decision on
due process.
17. 405 U.S. at 652.
18. Id. at 651.
19. 126 I11. App. 2d 410, 262 N.E.2d 717 (1979), vacated, 405 U.S. 1051 (1972).
20. 47 Wis. 2d 420, 178 N.W.2d 56 (1970), vacated sub. nom. Rothstein v. Lutheran
Social Servs., 405 U.S. 1051 (1972).
21. Vanderlaan v. Vanderlaan, 9 Ill. App. 3d 260, 292 N.E.2d 145 (1972).
22. 178 N.W.2d at 63.
23. State ex rel. Lewis v. Lutheran Social Servs., 59 Wis. 2d 1, 207 N.W.2d 826 (1973).
24. 207 N.W.2d at 832-33.
25. In Stanley the Court commented:
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being deprived of their children. Reacting to Stanley, many states modi-
fied their adoption statutes to give the putative father a limited right in
preventing the adoption of his child,26 and one state interpreted Stanley
broadly by giving the father absolute equality with the unwed mother re-
garding the right to veto the adoption of their illegitimate child. 27
After a period of six years, 28 the Supreme Court explained the breadth
of the Stanley holding in a unanimous decision in Quilloin v. Walcott.29 In
Quilloin the natural father of an illegitimate child challenged the constitu-
tionality of a Georgia statute30 that required only the mother's consent to
the adoption of an illegitimate child unless the father had obtained an or-
We note in passing that the incremental cost of offering unwed fathers an
opportunity for individualized hearings on fitness appears to be minimal. If
unwed fathers, in the main, do not care about the disposition of their children,
they will not appear to demand hearings. If they do care, under the scheme
here held invalid, Illinois would admittedly at some later time have to afford
them a properly focused hearing in a custody or adoption proceeding.
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 657 n.9 (1972).
Professor Harry D. Krause concluded that Stanley was an "imprecise opinion, giving the
father an interest in his illegitimate child's custody and adoption" but "causing difficulty
with the adoption process in many states, as many courts and some legislatures . . . inter-
preted the case to require notice of adoption--even to unknown fathers .... " Krause, The
Uniform ParentageAct, 8 FAM. L.Q. 1, 7-8 (1974). As one author realized, Stanley "inevita-
bly carrie[d] the potential for altering drastically the legal framework of the adoption proc-
ess." Note, The "Strange Boundaries" of Stanley.- Providing Notice of Adoption to the
Unknown Putative Father, 59 VA. L. REV. 517, 518 (1973).
26. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 224 (West Supp. 1980); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 908(2)(a)(Supp. 1978); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.24(1)(a) (West Supp. 1980); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-
8-111 (1979); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-104 (1978); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.32.030(2)
(Supp. 1978); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.84 (West 1979). For information on the Texas adoption
statutes, see notes 129-36 infra.
27. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-106 (West Supp. 1979-1980) provides: "No adoption
shall be granted unless consent to adopt has been obtained and filed with the court from the
following: 1. From both natural parents, if living. The present statute supersedes the
original section that provided:
Consent is not necessary from a father who was not married to the mother of
the child both at the time of its conception and at the time of its birth, unless
the father under oath has acknowledged parentage in a document filed with
the court or with the agency or division at or prior to the time the petition is
filed, or unless the parentage of the father has been previously established by
judicial proceedings.
Id. § 8-106(A)(l)(d) (West 1974) (amended 1976).
28. During that period, in Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977), the Supreme Court con-
sidered the constitutionality of §§ I 101(b)(l)(D) and I 101(b)(2) of the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act of 1952. 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (1970) (amended 1976). The Act provided that a
parent or child of a United States citizen could get special preference immigration status
without regard to a quota. The definition of "child" included an illegitimate child claiming
preference through his mother but did not include an illegitimate child claiming preference
through his father. All three appellants in Fiallo, one the father of an illegitimate alien
child, the other two, illegitimate children of alien fathers, lost their due process and equal
protection claims under the fifth amendment. The Court, recognizing that Congress's power
to exclude aliens was subject to narrow judicial review, upheld the statute, based on the
hypothesis that Congress had created the statutory classification to alleviate paternity proof
problems. 430 U.S. at 799.
29. 434 U.S. 246 (1978). For a more detailed discussion of this case, see Note, Illegiti-
macy and the Rights of Unwed Fathers in Adoption Proceedings After Quilloin v. Walcott, 12
J. MAR. L.J. 383 (1979); Note, The Putative Father's Parental Rights. A Focus on "Family"
58 NEB. L. REV. 610 (1979).
30. GA. CODE ANN. § 74-403(3) (1973).
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der of legitimation 3' that gave him authority to veto the adoption. In con-
trast, the general statutory scheme 32 required the consent of both parents
of a legitimate child. The putative father petitioned the court, opposing
the adoption of his eleven-year-old son by the boy's stepfather and seeking
an order of legitimation and visitation rights. After a hearing to determine
the father's interest in his son, the trial court ruled that the father should be
denied the request for legitimation and visitation rights and that the adop-
tion should be granted.33 The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. 34 Ap-
pealing to the United States Supreme Court, the father argued that he had
been denied due process because he had not been declared unfit as re-
quired by Stanley and that he had been denied equal protection because
the statute discriminated against a putative father by refusing him the
same power to veto an adoption that it provided to a married or divorced
father. 35 The Supreme Court rejected both arguments, 36 noting that the
"best interests of the child" demanded that the child remain with the fam-
ily unit that had been provided him by his mother and his stepfather for
seven years. 37 The petitioner had shown only sporadic interest in his
child 38 and had never sought custody. The Court distinguished the peti-
tioner's situation from that of a married or divorced father, emphasizing
31. An order of legitimation is a court order granted pursuant to a statutory provision
providing for the legitimation of an illegitimate child. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 811 (5th
ed. 1979).
32. GA. CODE ANN. § 74-403(1) (1973).
33. 434 U.S. at 250. The trial court found that, although the child had never been aban-
doned or deprived, the natural father had provided support on an irregular basis. In addi-
tion, the child expressed a desire to be adopted by his mother's husband who was found to
be a fit and proper person to adopt the child. The trial court therefore concluded that the
proposed adoption was in the best interests of the child. Id. at 25 1. "Best interests of the
child" is one of the most important factors in determining the question of child custody. It
is, however, a broad, indefinite term. To determine what is in the "child's best interest" a
court may consider the moral fitness of the parties, the home environment, the child's emo-
tional ties to the parties, the parties' emotional ties to the child, the age, sex, or health of the
child, the desirability of continuing an existing third-party relationship, and the preference
of the child. See Turner v. Pannick, 540 P.2d 1051, 1054 (Alaska 1975). Some writers have
criticized the consideration of parental rights in determining a child's best interests, sug-
gesting instead that the total emphasis be the consideration of the child's situation and de-
velopmental needs. See J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST
INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 106 (1973).
34. Quilloin v. Walcott, 238 Ga. 230, 232 S.E.2d 246, 248-49 (1977) (footnote omitted):
The natural father contends that the Georgia statutes take away his parental
rights without due process of law. He relies on Stanley v. Illinois . . . . In
Stanley, the Supreme Court held an Illinois statutory scheme unconstitutional
which required a hearing and proof of unfitness before the state could assume
custody of a child of married or divorced parents or unmarried mothers, yet
required no such showing before separating a child from an unwed father. In
Stanley, the father was a de facto member of the family unit, and the mother
had died. Either of these factual differences would be sufficient to distinguish
Stanley from the case before us. We find that Stanley is not controlling and
that Ga. Code Ann. §§ 74-203 and 74-403(3) violate neither equal protection
nor due process.
35. 434 U.S. at 253.
36. Id. at 254-56.
37. Id. at 255.
38. The putative father had consented to the recording of his name on the birth certifi-
cate and had made irregular support payments and infrequent visits. Id. at 249 n.6, 251.
19801
SO UTHWESTERN LAW JO RNAL
that the petitioner had never shouldered a "significant responsibility with
respect to the daily supervision, education, protection, or care of the
child."' 39 With this language, the Court in Quilloin clarified Stanley by
stressing the necessity of a substantial relationship between a putative fa-
ther and his illegitimate child before the Court would grant a father consti-
tutional protection of his parental rights.
The petitioner's brief raised the additional equal protection claim that
the relevant Georgia statute40 discriminated on the basis of sex by requir-
ing only the consent of the unwed mother for an adoption.4 The Supreme
Court rejected this claim on the ground that it had not been presented in
the petitioner's jurisdictional statement 2.4  When the Court decided Stan-
ley, it also had refused to confront the issue of sex discrimination against
the putative father.43 In the recent cases of Parham v. Hughes 4 and Caban
v. Mohammed a5 however, the Court analyzed the father's sex discrimina-
tion claim. To provide background for the equal protection analysis in
these two cases, this Comment discusses first the standards of review the
Supreme Court has applied to classifications based on gender.
II. EQUAL PROTECTION: A STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR GENDER-
BASED CLASSIFICATIONS
The fourteenth amendment provides that "[n]o state shall. . . deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."' 46 To
determine whether a state law violated this clause, the United States
Supreme Court previously employed a two-tiered model for equal protec-
tion review.47 The first tier involved minimal scrutiny of the challenged
legislation to determine whether a rational relationship between the statute
and a legitimate state interest existed.48 When the statutory classification
39. Id. at 256.
40. GA. CODE ANN. § 74-403(3) (1973).
41. 434 U.S. at 253 n.13.
42. Id.
43. See Ginsburg, supra note 16.
44. 441 U.S. 347 (1979).
45. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
46. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
47. See Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword" In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court.- A Modelfor a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8
(1972).
48. In McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961), the Court, holding constitu-
tional a statute providing for Sunday closing laws, stated:
[The equal protection clause] is offended only if the classification rests on
grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective. State
legislatures are presumed to have acted within their constitutional power de-
spite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in inequality. A statutory dis-
crimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be
conceived to justify it.
For a recent decision based on the rational basis test, see City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427
U.S. 297 (1976). This test results in considerable deference to state legislatures and has
traditionally been used in the sphere of economic regulation. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW 996 (1978).
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concerned a fundamental right49 or a suspect class,5 0 however, the Court,
using a second standard of review, applied strict scrutiny to the classifica-
tion to determine whether it was warranted or justified by a compelling
state interest.5 ' The Court's choice of which standard to apply usually de-
termined the outcome of the challenge; most classifications withstand min-
imal scrutiny, but most fail under strict scrutiny.52
The Supreme Court traditionally gave only minimal scrutiny to classifi-
cations based on gender and, therefore, always upheld them as reason-
able, 53 based upon presumptions about the appropriate roles of men and
women in society. In 1971, however, the Court in Reed v. Reed 54 signifi-
cantly changed its previous position by invalidating a statute that discrimi-
nated against women on the basis of sex.5 5 Writing for a unanimous
Court, Chief Justice Burger suggested a heightened scrutiny of the statute,
noting that a classification must have "a fair and substantial relation to the
object of the legislation. ' 56 Certain commentators5 7 viewed the Court's
action in Reed as a break from the two-tiered analysis previously em-
ployed and a move toward an intermediate level of scrutiny. The Court's
language, however, did not provide a clear standard to be used for gender
discrimination.5 8
49. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right to privacy); Reynolds
v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (right to vote); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (right
to procreate).
50. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1962) (race). In Graham v. Richardson, 403
U.S. 365 (1971), the Court treated alienage as a suspect classification. But see Foley v. Con-
nelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978) (rationality standard applied to uphold statute requiring all police
officers to be United States citizens; such standard appropriate only when state limits the
right to govern to its citizens). In Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966),
the Court suggested that wealth might constitute a suspect condition. But see San Antonio
Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (although not specifically rejecting
wealth as a suspect classification, Court upheld school financing scheme based on local
property tax).
51. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
52. Professor Gunther characterizes minimal scrutiny as virtual judicial abdication and
strict scrutiny as "strict" in theory and "fatal" in fact..% Gunther, supra note 47, at 8.
53. See, e.g., Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (19615 (statute exempting all women from
jury service declared constitutional); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (statute permit-
ting no female bartenders other than a wife or daughter of male owner of liquor establish-
ment considered constitutional); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (statute limiting
women to 10-hour work day in laundry had a rational basis).
54. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
55. The challenged statute gave preference to men over women otherwise equally enti-
tled to appointment as administrators of a decedent's estate.
56. 404 U.S. at 76 (citing F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)).
The Chief Justice also echoed the language of the rational basis test: "The question
presented by this case . . . is whether a difference in the sex of competing applicants for
letters of administration bears a rational relationship to a state objective that is sought to be
advanced. ... Id. The Court concluded that, although the state's objective in adminis-
trative efficiency might be a legitimate one, it did not meet the demands of the equal protec-
tion clause. Id.
57. See, e.g., Gunther, supra note 47, at 33-34; Wilkinson, The Supreme Court, the Equal
Protection Clause and the Three Faces of Constitutional Equality, 61 ,VA. L. REV. 945, 953
(1975).
58. The ambiguity that existed in the Court's equal protection approach to gender-
based classifications prompted many commentators to analyze the Court's emerging inter-
19801
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The next sex discrimination case to reach the Supreme Court, Frontiero
'. Richardson,59 further exemplified the Court's search for a proper stan-
dard of scrutiny in gender-based classifications. In a plurality opinion,
60
Justice Brennan declared sex to be a suspect class by stating that
"[cilassifications based upon sex, like classifications based upon race,
alienage, or national origin, are inherently suspect, and must therefore be
subjected to strict judicial scrutiny."'6 1 Even though only three Justices
agreed with Justice Brennan that sex should be subject to strict scrutiny,
eight agreed that the challenged statute, even under the Reed intermediate
standard requiring a "fair and substantial relation" to the object of the
legislation, violated the equal protection clause.
Reed and Fronliero suggested that a heightened standard of review
would be applied to statutes discriminating against women on the basis of
sex, but the Court's opinion in both cases demonstrated the unsettled and
uncertain nature of its equal protection analysis in this area. The Court's
mediate level of analysis and to make various recommendations for a model to be used by
the Court. Professor Gunther, for example, described the Court's new analysis as intensified
"means scrutiny" and suggested that this level of scrutiny would close the wide gap between
strict scrutiny and minimal scrutiny not by abandoning the strict, but by raising the level of
the minimal from virtual abdication to genuine judicial inquiry. Gunther, supra note 47, at
24; see Loewy, A Dif/erent and More Viable Theory of Equal Protection, 57 N.C.L. REV. 1,
53-54 (1978), who proposed a one-tiered approach involving a three-pronged inquiry:
(I) Is the group discriminated against sufficiently analogous politically to a
racial minority to distrust a legislative or administrative decision discriminat-
ing against it? (2) If so, is there objective evidence of a legitimate non-discrim-
inatory purpose? (3) If so, is that evidence sufficient to render it probable that
the discriminatory effect was merely an incidental adjunct to the legitimate,
nondiscriminatory purpose?
See also Simson, A Methodfor Analyzing Discriminatory Effects Under the Equal Protection
Clause, 29 STAN. L. REV. 663, 678-79 (1977), who favored a four-level model of constitu-
tional analysis:
(1) Courts should decide whether the interest affected by the classification
before them is fundamental, significant or insignificant; (2) Courts should de-
termine whether the disadvantage to the affected interest is total, significant or
insignificant; (3) Courts should ascertain whether the interest in forming the
classification is compelling, significant, insignificant, or unlawful; (4) Courts
should determine the necessary, significant, insignificant, or nonexistent char-
acter of the relationship between means and end.
Professor Wilkinson suggested that the Court abandon the strict scrutiny of the suspect class
and consider three elements when making a constitutional inquiry: "(I) the importance of
the opportunity being unequally burdened or denied; (2) the strength of the state interest
served in denying it; and (3) the character of the groups whose opportunities are denied."
Wilkinson, supra note 57, at 991.
59. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
60. Justice Brennan was joined by Justices Douglas, White, and Marshall. Justice Stew-
art concurred in the judgment, citing Reed. The Chief Justice, joined by Justices Blackmun
and Powell, concurred in the judgment, but refused to characterize sex as a suspect classifi-
cation, deferring to state legislatures that would have the opportunity to consider the pro-
posed Equal Rights Amendment.
61. 411 U.S. at 688. The Court considered a federal statute providing that husbands of
women in the uniformed services were not dependents eligible for medical benefits and in-
creased housing allowances unless they were in fact dependent on their wives for more than
one-half of their support. The statutory scheme, on the other hand, allowed male members
of the services to claim their wives as dependents without proof of actual dependency. Id. at
678. The Court concluded that the government's interest in administrative efficiency failed
to justify the discrimination against servicewomen caused by the classification. Id. at 689.
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consideration of sex discrimination in four subsequent cases exemplified
the Court's further dilemma when confronting sex discrimination against
men. In Kahn v. Shevin62 the Court reviewed the constitutionality of a
statute that granted an annual property tax exemption to widows but not
to widowers. A majority of the Court, using the Reed "fair and substantial
relation" test, upheld the statutory distinction based upon its ameliorative
purpose 6 3 in compensating women for past discrimination. 64 Faced with a
case of "reverse" sex discrimination, 65 the Frontiero plurality split. Justice
Douglas refused to consider sex a suspect class when a male was the vic-
tim. 66 Significantly, although Justices Brennan and Marshall still labeled
gender-based classifications "suspect," they considered the statute invalid,
not because it discriminated against men, but because it was so broadly
drafted that it included women who did not need its benefits. 67 Only Jus-
tice White concluded that the statute unconstitutionally discriminated
against men.68 Despite the majority's attempt to distinguish Frontiero in
Kahn,69 the only clear distinction was the sex of the challenger.
Continuing this passive posture in examining statutes discriminating
against men, the Court in Schlesinger v. Ballard7° upheld the promotion
system of the United States Navy that mandated discharge of male lieuten-
ants who had twice failed to be selected for promotion.7' In contrast, the
statutory scheme required discharge of a female officer only if she was not
on a promotion list after thirteen years of active service.72 In response to
62. 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
63. But see Erickson, Kahn, Ballard, and Wiesenfeld" A New Equal Protection Test in
'Reverse" Sex Discrimination Cases?, 42 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1, 11 (1975), who believes that
the statute was not ameliorative at all but a stereotyped codification of attitudes toward
women and men. See also Ginsburg, supra note 16, at 466, in which the author concluded
that the Kahn decision evidenced a paternalistic attitude toward women.
64. 416 U.S. at 353-55. The majority also emphasized that the challenged statute in-
volved taxation, an area in which state legislatures traditionally possess great freedom. Id.
at 355. Justice Douglas used the language of rationality in speaking of the deference gener-
ally accorded tax statutes. Id.; see, e.g., Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 88 (1940) (up-
holding state taxing power).
65. This term applies to discrimination against men. For a discussion of reverse sex
discrimination, see Erickson, supra note 63, at 11.
66. Given the three criteria for suspectness that the plurality had enunciated in Fron-
tiero, Justice Douglas's opinion is understandable. These three criteria characterize a sus-
pect class: (1) the class suffers from an immutable characteristic determined solely by
accident of birth and bearing no relation to the ability to contribute in society, (2) the class
suffers historic vilification, and (3) the class lacks effective political power and redress.
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 685-86 n.17 (1973). Although Justice Douglas did
not explicitly analyze widowers in terms of these three criteria, he did describe the American
culture as "male-dominated," thus implying that, although maleness is an immutable char-
acteristic, widowers as a class have suffered no historic discrimination or political powerless-
ness. 416 U.S. at 353-56.
67. 416 U.S. at 360.
68. Id. at 361.
69. The Court stressed that the sole justification for the statutory discrimination in Fron-
tiero was administrative efficiency, while the challenged legislation m Kahn did not discrim-
inate against anyone, but provided a remedial benefit to women who had suffered previous
economic discrimination. Id. at 355.
70. 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
71. 10 U.S.C. § 6380(a) (1970) (amended 1976).
72. Id. § 640 1(a).
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the male petitioner's contention that he had been discriminated against on
the basis of sex, Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, determined that
male and female officers were not similarly situated with regard to career
advancement opportunities, and thus he apparently applied only the ra-
tional basis test in upholding the statute.73 Moreover, the majority
reinforced Kahn by stressing that the challenged statutes compensated wo-
men for other restrictions imposed upon them by reason of their sex and
thus met the "fair and substantial relation" test of Reed.
The Court rejected such a compensation theory in Weinberger v. Wiesen-
feld74 and invalidated a provision of the Social Security Act 75 that denied
benefits to a widower while granting benefits to a widow based on the
earnings of her deceased husband. The Court, however, avoided con-
fronting the reverse discrimination issue by viewing the statutory scheme
as a discrimination against wage-earning women, who paid the same social
security taxes as men, rather than against the surviving widower. With no
mention of Reed's equal protection standard, the Court used the language
of the rational basis test and declared the gender-based classification "en-
tirely irrational. '76
Kahn, Ballard, and Wiesenfeld demonstrated the Court's unwillingness
to find the respective statutes unconstitutional based on discrimination
against men. In Craig v. Boren,77 however, the Court not only took an
73. The Court emphasized:
[T]he different treatment of men and women naval officers under [the statu-
tory scheme] reflects, not archaic and overbroad generalizations, but, instead,
the demonstrable fact that male and female line officers in the Navy are not
similarly situated with respect to opportunities for professional service ...
Specifically, "women may not be assigned to duty in aircraft that are engaged
in combat missions nor may they be assigned to duty on vessels of the Navy
other than hospital ships and transports." 10 U.S.C. § 6015. Thus, in compet-
ing for promotion, female lieutenants will not generally have compiled records
of seagoing service comparable to those of male lieutenants. In enacting and
retaining § 6401, Congress may thus quite rationally have believed that wo-
men line officers had less opportunity for promotion than did their male coun-
terparts, and that a longer period of tenure for women officers would,
therefore, be consistent with the goal to provide women officers with "fair and
equitable career advancement programs."
419 U.S. at 508 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 216, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1967)). Significantly,
the dissimilar situations of the men and women were imposed by the statutory scheme. See
note 102 infra for a comment on the same statutory imposition of dissimilar treatment in
Parham.
74. 420 U.S. 636 (1975). The Court declared: "[Tihe mere recitation of a benign, com-
pensatory purpose is not an automatic shield which protects against any inquiry into the
actual purposes underlying a statutory scheme." Id. at 648.
75. 42 U.S.C. § 402(g) (1976).
76. 420 U.S. at 651. The Court invalidated the discrimination against working women
by apparently using only the minimal scrutiny of the rational basis test; yet in Kahn and
Ballard the Court had upheld statutes discriminating against men while using the more
rigorous scrutiny of the Reed test.
77. 429 U.S. 190 (1976). For reviews of this decision, see Comment, Gender-BasedDis-
crimination and a Developing Standard of Equal Protection Analysis, 46 U. CIN. L. REV. 572
(1977); Note, The Searchfor a Standard of Review in Sex Discrimination Questions, 14 Hous.
L. REV. 721 (1977); Note, Gender-Based Discrimination and Equal Protection.- The Emerging
Intermediate Standard, 29 U. FLA. L. REV. 582 (1977).
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activist position by invalidating a statute that discriminated against
males,78 but also enunciated an intermediate standard for equal protection
review in gender discrimination cases. 79  The Court stated:
"[C]lassifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives
and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives. 80
After Craig, a majority of the Court remained consistent and applied the
substantial relationship standard to gender-based statutes. 8' In Orr v.
Orr,82 a recent case involving sex discrimination against a male petitioner,
the Court applied that standard to invalidate an Alabama statute requiring
husbands but not wives to pay alimony.83 Orr suggested that the Court
would approach discrimination against men with increased sensitivity, but
Parham v. Hughes84 and Caban v. Mohammed,85 when considered to-
78. 429 U.S. at 191-92. The challenged Oklahoma statute prohibited the sale of 3.2%
beer to males under 21 and females under 18.
79. The Court has recently applied this standard to classifications based on illegitimacy.
Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 234 (1978). For an analysis of the balancing process involved in a
"substantial relationship" standard, see Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term-Foreword"
Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 182-88 (1977). See
generally Comment, Equal Protection and the "Middle Tier'" The Impact on Women and
Illegitimates, 54 NOTRE DAME LAW. 303 (1978). See also Bice, Standards of Judicial Repiew
Under the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses, 50 S. CAL. L. REV. 689 (1977).
80. 429 U.S. at 197. Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment but strongly disagreed
as to the standard used. He stressed:
There is only one Equal Protection Clause .... It does not direct courts to
apply one standard of review in some cases and a different standard in other
cases ... I am inclined to believe that what has become known as the two-
tiered analysis of equal protection claims does not describe a completely logi-
cal method of deciding cases, but rather is a method the Court has employed
to explain decisions that actually apply to a single standard in a reasonably
consistent fashion.
Id. at 211-12 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist dissented on the basis of the standard used by the plu-
rality. Both favored the continued application of the rational basis test to gender classifica-
tions. Justice Rehnquist wrote:
I would think we have had enough difficulty with the two standards of review
which our cases have recognized-the norm of "rational basis," and the "com-
pelling state interest" required when a "suspect classification" is involved-so
as to counsel weightily against the insertion of still another "standard" be-
tween those two. How is this Court to divine what objectives are important?
How is it to determine whether a particular law is "substantially" related to
the achievement of such objectives, rather than related in some other way to
its achievement? Both of the phrases used are so diaphanous and elastic as to
invite subjective judicial preferences or prejudices relating to particular types
of legislation, masquerading as judgments whether such legislation is directed
at "important" objectives or, whether the relationship to those objectives is
"substantial" enough.
Id. at 220-21 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
81. See Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (upholding a statutory classification
giving more favorable benefits to retired female workers than to retired male workers be-
cause of its ameliorative purpose); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977) (invalidating a
statute providing survivor benefits to widows but denying them to widowers unless the de-
ceased wife had provided three quarters of the couple's support).
82. 440 U.S. 268 (1978).
83. ALA. CODE § 30-2-51 (1975).
84. 441 U.S. 347 (1979).
85. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
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gether, show the Court's indecision when the male discriminated against
has fathered an illegitimate child.
III. SEX DISCRIMINATION AGAINST PUTATIVE FATHERS
In Parham and Caban the Court not only reviewed gender-based dis-
crimination against men, but also, for the first time, considered claims of
sex discrimination against fathers of illegitimate children.86 The Georgia
statute87 under review in Parham allowed the mother of an illegitimate
child to sue for the wrongful death of that child. In contrast, the statutory
scheme denied the father a wrongful death action unless he had legiti-
mated the child.88 The father brought an action seeking to recover for the
wrongful death of his illegitimate son who was killed along with his
mother in an automobile accident. The child's maternal grandmother, ad-
ministratrix of the estate, also brought an action to recover for the boy's
wrongful death. 89 In response to the father's claim, the appellee moved for
a summary judgment, asserting that the putative father did not have stand-
ing to sue because he had never legitimated his child pursuant to the statu-
tory requirement. 90 The trial court denied the summary judgment,
concluding that the statute violated the due process and equal protection
clauses of the fourteenth amendment.9' The Georgia Supreme Court re-
versed, finding the statute rationally related to three legitimate state inter-
ests: (1) avoiding difficult problems of proving paternity, (2) promoting a
legitimate family unit, and (3) setting a standard of morality. 92
The United States Supreme Court affirmed. Justice Stewart, writing for
86. The Court decided Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), with a due process ra-
tionale. See notes 11-18 supra and accompanying text. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246
(1978), raised a twofold equal protection claim, but the Court dismissed the claim of sex
discrimination and treated only the claim of discrimination between married or divorced
fathers, on the one hand, and unwed fathers, on the other. See notes 29-41 supra and
accompanying text.
87. GA. CODE ANN. § 105-1307 (1968).
88. Id. § 74-103 (1973) provides:
A father of an illegitimate child may render the same legitimate by petitioning
the superior court of the county of his residence, setting forth the name, age
and sex of such child, and also the name of the mother; and if he desires the
name changed, stating the new name, and praying the legitimation of such
child. Of this application the mother, if alive, shall have notice. Upon such
application, presented and filed, the court may pass an order declaring said
child to be legitimate, and capable of inheriting from the father in the same
manner as if born in lawful wedlock, and the name by which he or she shall be
known.
89. Id. § 105-1309 (Supp. 1979) provides:
In cases where there is no person entitled to sue under the foregoing provi-
sions of this Chapter [the Georgia Wrongful Death Chapter], the administra-
tor or executor of the decedent may sue for and recover and hold the amount
recovered for the benefit of the next of kin. In any such case the amount of the
recovery shall be the full value of the life of the decedent.
90. Although never formally legitimating the child, the father had signed the birth cer-
tificate, contributed to his support, and visited him regularly. 441 U.S. at 349.
91. Id. at 350.
92. Hughes v. Parham, 241 Ga. 198, 243 S.E.2d 867, 869-70 (1978).
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the plurality,93 acknowledged that "a State is not free to make overbroad
generalizations based on sex which are entirely unrelated to any differ-
ences between men and women or which demean the ability or social sta-
tus of the affected class."'94 A statutory classification containing such an
overbroad generalization constitutes an invidious discrimination.95 Ac-
cording to the plurality opinion, a threshold test must be applied to deter-
mine if a gender-based classification results in such invidious
discrimination. Only when a challenged statute contains distinctions
based exclusively on the biological differences between men and women
rather than the differences in their situations96 will the plurality then apply
the Craig substantial relationship test.97 In Parham, the plurality discov-
ered a significant difference between men and women in the statutory
scheme itself. The opinion stressed that fathers and mothers of illegitimate
children were not similarly situated98 because the Georgia statute allowed
a father, but not a mother, to legitimate his child99 and thus to control the
child's status. Therefore, Justice Stewart determined that the statute dis-
criminated, not on the basis of sex, but on the basis of those fathers who
legitimated their children and those who did not. Having decided that no
invidious sex discrimination existed, the plurality exercised only minimal
scrutiny of the statute and found a rational relationship between the legiti-
mation requirement and the state's interest in proving paternity to avoid
fraudulent claims. By applying a threshold test to determine if the statute's
apparent gender distinction was based on any difference between men and
women other than mere sex and then finding the crucial distinction be-
tween fathers and mothers in the statutory scheme imposed by the state,' 00
the plurality opinion suggests that at least these members of the Court may
search for any difference at all to justify characterizing the statute as other
93. Justice Stewart was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist and Ste-
vens. Justice Powell concurred in the judgment.
94. 441 U.S. at 354.
95. Justice Stewart wrote in his Caban dissent:
Sex-based classifications are in many settings invidious because they relegate a
person to the place set aside for the group on the basis of an attribute that the
person cannot change . . . .Nonetheless, gender-based classifications are not
invariably invalid. When men and women are not in fact similarly situated in
the area covered by the legislation in question, the Equal Protection Clause is
not violated.
Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. at 398 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
96. 441 U.S. at 354.
97. Professor Tribe suggested that invidious discrimination usually requires strict scru-
tiny. L. TRIBE, supra note 48, at 1011; therefore, the use of this term as a threshold determi-
nation before the application of intermediate scrutiny confuses the equal protection analysis.
98. Justice Stewart distinguished Reed and Frontiero because the claimants in those sex
discrimination cases were similarly situated to those of the opposite sex who benefitted from
the statutory scheme. 441 U.S. at 356-57.
99. The Court noted that the constitutionality of the legitimation provision was not
before the Court. Id. at 355 n.6.
100. Justice White's dissenting opinion emphasized the circularity of the plurality's argu-
ment by stating: "That only fathers may resort to the legitimization process cannot dissolve
the sex discrimination in requiring them to." Id. at 361 (White, J., dissenting); see note 102infra.
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than gender-based. This posture effectively limits the instances in which
the Craig test will be applied.
Justice Powell concurred in the Court's judgment, but wrote a separate
opinion solely because he disagreed with the equal protection test used by
the plurality. Recognizing that the statute resulted in sex discrimination
against unwed fathers, Justice Powell wrote that gender-based distinctions
must "serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially
related to achievement of those objectives."l 0 ' Even though Justice Powell
would have used heightened scrutiny in examining the statute, he would
have found a substantial relationship between the statute's requirements
and the state's interest in avoiding difficult problems of proof of pater-
nity. 102
Neither the plurality opinion nor the concurring opinion squarely ad-
dressed the other two asserted state interests of encouraging family units
and setting standards of morality. The plurality, instead, emphasized the
father's control over both the original act of conception and the later act of
legitimation and concluded it was "neither illogical nor unjust . . . to ex-
press . . . 'condemnation of irresponsible liaisons beyond the bounds of
marriage' by not conferring upon a biological father the statutory right to
sue for the wrongful death of his illegitimate child."' 1 3 This censure of the
putative father contrasted sharply with the Court's attitude toward the
mother of an illegitimate child in Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability
Insurance Co.'0 4 In that case the Court invalidated a Louisiana statute
that denied the mother a wrongful death action, ' 0 5 declaring:
[W]e see no possible rational basis. . . for assuming that if the natu-
ral mother is allowed recovery for the wrongful death of her illegiti-
mate child, the cause of illegitimacy will be served. It would, indeed,
be far-fetched to assume that women have illegitimate children so that
they can be compensated in damages for their death. 10 6
The plurality in Parham distinguished Glona by pointing out that the Lou-
isiana statute denied all unwed women a wrongful death action whereas
the Georgia statute in Parham denied only those fathers who had not legit-
imated their children.' 0 7 Yet, the plurality did not mention that the
mother in Glona could have legitimated her child under the state's statu-
101. 441 U.S. at 359 (Powell, J., concurring) (citing Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197
(1977)).
102. Applying the same substantial relationship test, however, Justice White would have
reached the opposite result. In a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall,
and Blackmun, Justice White focused on the irrationality of the plurality's conclusion that
because the state statute required putative fathers to legitimate their children, these fathers
were not similarly situated to mothers who were not required to do so. In other words, the
statutory scheme caused the dissimilar treatment, and the plurality resorted to it to prove the
father's dissimilar situation.
103. 441 U.S. at 353. Yet, the plurality's opinion suggests that a biological father who
obtains a legitimation order is less deserving of condemnation for his "sinful" act.
104. 391 U.S. 73 (1968).
105. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2315 (West 1952).
106. 391 U.S. at 75.
107. 441 U.S. at 355 n.7.
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tory scheme to become eligible to recover, 0 8 did not do so, and still pre-
vailed. In Parham the Court based its decision on the state's interest in
proving paternity, but the result suggests that the Court, even though it
used the rational basis test in both Parham and Glona, condoned a statute
penalizing fathers of illegitimate children but not one affecting mothers.
The decision in Caban v. Mohammed'0 9 provides an anomalous contrast
to the result in Parham. The statute under attack in Caban required only
the consent of the mother for the adoption of her illegitimate child."10 Ac-
cordingly, it operated to prevent adoption by a putative father of his chil-
dren if the mother withheld consent and to deny the father the same veto
unless he could prove that adoption by someone else would not be in the
child's best interest. Appellant Caban fathered two illegitimate children1 "
during the several years he lived with their mother. The children's birth
certificates identified Caban as their father, and he continued to contribute
to their support even after the mother left with the children to marry the
appellee Mohammed. After the appellant tried to gain custody of the chil-
dren, the appellees, the mother and her husband, petitioned to adopt them.
Caban cross-petitioned for adoption, but the New York Surrogate Court
granted the Mohammeds' petition." 2 The New York Supreme Court" 3
and the New York Court of Appeals affirmed,' 14 based on the state's con-
cern for the best interests of the child for whom adoption provides a legiti-
mate family unit.
Caban appealed to the United States Supreme Court, claiming that the
gender-based distinction in the statute violated the equal protection clause
and that he had been denied due process because he had not been proved
an unfit parent, as required by Stanley, before being deprived of his chil-
dren." 5 Although a similar Georgia statute had been upheld in Quil-
loin, 1 6 the Court, in a five-to-four decision, invalidated the New York
statute. Justice Powell, writing for the majority, joined the four dissenting
Justices from Parham" 17 and applied the intermediate level of equal pro-
tection scrutiny" 8 to the statute without mentioning the threshold test of
Parham.' '9 The Court stressed that fundamental differences do not exist
between mothers and fathers in their relationships with their children;
108. 391 U.S. at 79 n.7.
109. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
110. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 111 (McKinney 1977).
111. The children were four and six years old at the time of the claim.
112. 441 U.S. at 383-84.
113. In re Anonymous, 56 A.D.2d 627, 391 N.Y.S.2d 846 (1977).
114. In re Anonymous, 43 N.Y.2d 708, 372 N.E.2d 42, 401 N.Y.S.2d 208 (1977).
115. 441 U.S. at 385.
116. See notes 29-39 supra and accompanying text.
117. Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun joined Justice Powell in the deci-
sion of the Court.
118. The Court also repeated the Reed test requiring a fair and substantial relation to the
objective of the legislation, suggesting that the Reed and Craig tests are interchangeable.
441 U.S. at 391.
119. Justice Powell, who believed the substantial relationship standard should have been
applied in Parham, authored the Caban decision.
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therefore, the statute would apparently fail the threshold test, if it were
applied, because no differences other than sex separated the mother of an
illegitimate child who could consent to the child's adoption and the father
who could not. Because, in some instances, the father-child relationship is
fully comparable to the mother-child relationship once the child passes
infancy,' 20 the Court rejected the appellees' contention that mothers are
closer to their children than fathers. The Court distinguished Quilloin on
the ground that the father in that case had not established a substantial
relationship with his children as had Caban. 12' Recognizing the state's
legitimate interest in promoting adoptions, the Court nonetheless decided
that this interest did not justify the gender-based distinction in the statute.
Furthermore, the Court saw no reason to uphold the statute in order to
avoid problems in identifying unwed fathers because those fathers who did
not participate in rearing their children could constitutionally be denied
the privilege of vetoing their adoption, 22 while those fathers like Caban
who continued to have a close relationship with their children past infancy
could easily be identified. 12 3
The four Supreme Court Justices who joined Justice Powell in striking
the adoption statute discriminating against fathers of illegitimate children
in Caban also would have granted the putative father's claim in Parham.
As a result of Justice Powell's shifting alignment 124 in these two cases,
however, the law now requires a putative father's consent to the adoption
of his children if he has maintained a close relationship with them, but
denies him a recovery in damages for their wrongful death unless he has
legitimated them. Justice Powell clarified his contrasting opinions by em-
phasizing that the statutory scheme in Parham gave the father complete
control over the disqualifying factor in the statute by permitting a wrong-
ful death action by a father if he had legitimated his children.' 25 In
Caban, on the other hand, the father could not remove himself from the
statutory burden-regardless of his proof of paternity.
Justice Powell's opinions in these two cases suggest his application of a
sliding equal protection standard for evaluating gender-based statutes af-
fecting putative fathers that depends on whether an economic interest or
an interest in preserving a personal relationship between father and child
120. The Court's conclusion about father-child relationships was limited to children past
infancy. 441 U.S. at 389.
121. Id. at 389 n.7.
122. Id. at 392. For a discussion of this conclusion in Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246
(1978), see text accompanying notes 29-39 supra.
123. 441 U.S. at 393.
124. Justice Powell concurred with Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, Rehnquist,
and Stevens in Parham, but joined with Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun
to form the majority in Caban.
125. Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. at 360. Justice White's dissent points out, however,
that the Georgia statutory scheme prevents even fathers of legitimate children from bringing
a wrongful death action when the mother is alive, so that the entire scheme is based on the
presumption that fathers are not injured by the death of their children and not deserving of a
recovery for their loss. Id. at 368.
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is involved. 126 Although Justice Powell purportedly would have applied
the same substantial relationship standard in both Parham and Caban, his
argument in Parham that the state's interest in proof of paternity justifies
the exclusion of a putative father from a wrongful death recovery pales
when he considers the state interest in proving paternity insufficient in
Caban and accepts the identical proof 12 7 from a putative father who
wishes to prevent his child's adoption. Justice Powell himself has ac-
knowledged that "[h]ard questions cannot be avoided by a hypothetical
reshuffling of the facts." 28
IV. EFFECT OF CABAN AND PARHAM ON TEXAs ADOPTION AND
WRONGFUL DEATH PROCEDURE
Before being considered a parent under the Texas statutory scheme, a
putative father must legitimate his child. 129 Under section 13.21 130 of the
Texas Family Code, legitimation of a child by his father first requires the
father's execution of a statement of paternity.' 3' Subsections 13.21(b)(3)
and 13.21(c) also require the consent of the mother, the person with cus-
tody, or the court before a father may legitimate his child and thus be
considered a parent with the commensurate statutory rights and protec-
126. Parham sought only after-death dollar benefits. Caban, however, had married an-
other woman after he and Marie Mohammed separated and wished to adopt his children
and continue a relationship with them; once adoption by the stepfather was approved, how-
ever, the New York statutory scheme denied the natural father of an illegitimate child any
rights, including visitation. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 117 (McKinney 1977).
127. Both Caban and Parham had signed their children's birth certificates, contributed to
their support and maintained regular contact. Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. at 349; Caban v.
Mohammed, 441 U.S. at 382.
128. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 774 (1977).
129. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.01(3) (Vernon 1975) provides: "'Parent' means the
mother, a man as to whom the child is legitimate, or an adoptive mother or father, but does
not include a parent as to whom the parent-child relationship has been terminated."
130. Id. § 13.21 (Vernon Supp. 1980) (footnote omitted) provides:
(a) If a statement of paternity has been executed by the father of an illegiti-
mate child, the father or mother of the child or the State Department of
Public Welfare may file a petition for a decree designating the father as a
parent of the child. The statement of paternity must be attached to the
petition.
(b) The court shall enter a decree designating the child as the legitimate
child of its father and the father as a parent of the child if the court finds
that:
(1) the parent-child relationship between the child and its original
mother has not been terminated by a decree of the court;
(2) the statement of paternity was executed as provided in this chapter,
and the facts stated therein are true; and
(3) the mother or the managing conservator, if any, has consented to
the decree.
(c) The requirement of consent of the mother is satisfied if she is the peti-
tioner. If the entry of the decree is in the best interest of the child, the
court may consent to the legitimation of the child in lieu of the consent of
the mother or managing conservator.
(d) A suit for voluntary legitimation may be joined with a suit for termina-
tion under Chapter 15 of this code.
(e) A suit under this section may be instituted at any time.
131. Id. § 13.22.
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tions afforded to parents. 32 If legitimation is granted by the court, the
putative father's consent to the adoption of his child is essential, because
section 16.03 provides that "no petition for adoption of a child may be
considered unless there has been a decree terminating the parent-child re-
lationship as to each living parent of the child or unless the termination
proceeding is joined with the proceeding for adoption."' 133
Neither unwed mothers nor parents of legitimate children have to meet
the legitimation and consent requirement of section 13.21 before establish-
ment of their parental rights. 134 Furthermore, to divest parents of legiti-
mate children or mothers of illegitimate children of their parental rights,
the state must show them to be unfit according to the standards of section
15.02.135 By requiring the consent of the mother or the court before a pu-
132. See Smith, Illegitimate Children and Their Fathers. Some Problems with Title 2, 5
TEX. TECH L. REV. 613, 621 (1974).
133. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 16.03(b) (Vernon Supp. 1980).
134. Id. §§ 12.01-.02 (Vernon 1975 & Supp. 1980).
135. Id. § 15.02 (Vernon Supp. 1980) provides:
A petition requesting termination of the parent-child relationship with re-
spect to a parent who is not the petitioner may be granted if the court finds
that:
(1) the parent has:
(A) voluntarily left the child alone or in the possession of another not the
parent and expressed an intent not to return; or
(B) voluntarily left the child alone or in the possession of another not the
parent without expressing an intent to return, without providing for the ade-
quate support of the child, and remained away for a period of at least three
months; or
(C) voluntarily left the child alone or in the possession of another without
providing adequate support of the child and remained away for a period of at
least six months; or
(D) knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the child to remain in condi-
tions or surroundings which endanger the physical or emotional well-being of
the child; or
(E) engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons who
engage in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of
the child; or(F) failed to support the child in accordance with his ability during the
period of one year ending within six months of the date of the filing of the
petition; or
(G) abandoned the child without indentifying the child or furnishing
means of identification, and the child's identity cannot be ascertained by the
exercise of reasonable diligence; or
(H) voluntarily, and with knowledge of the pregnancy, abandoned the
mother of the child beginning at a time during her pregnancy with the child
and continuing through birth, failed to provide adequate support or medical
care for the mother during the period of abandonment before the birth of the
child, and remained apart from the child or failed to support the child since
the birth; or
(I) contumaciously refused to submit to a reasonable and lawful order of a
court under Section 34.05 of this code; or
(J) been the major cause of:
(i) the failure of the child to be enrolled in school as required by the
Texas Education Code; or
(ii) the child's absence from his home without the consent of his parents
or guardian for a substantial length of time or without the intent to return;
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tative father can legitimate his child and thus become a parent, 136 the
Texas statute can operate to deprive the natural father of his child without
proof before the court that the father is unfit according to section 15.02.
Rather, the court, in its discretion, 137 can determine that the best interests
of the child merit a denial of the putative father's claim. 38 According to
Stanley v. Illinois,139 a natural father is "entitled to a hearing on his fitness
as a parent before his children [are] 'taken from him . . . ,140 To grant
such a hearing to fathers of legitimate children while denying it to fathers
of illegitimate children violates the equal protection clause. The provision
of section 13.21 requiring a third party's consent before establishment of
the putative father's rights while imposing no such condition upon fathers
of legitimate children, therefore, could have been considered unconstitu-
tional judged by Stanley standards even before the impact of the Caban
decision.
The Texas Supreme Court, however, in In re K 14 1 upheld the provision
of subsection 13.21(c) that allows court discretion to deny a legitimation
decree based on the best interests of the child. 142 The court wrote: "Stan-
ley does not decree that all unwed fathers have fundamental rights to full
parental status or that every statutory discrimination against the unwed
father is suspect. The overriding interest of state and courts is the welfare
of the affected children."'' 43 According to the Texas Supreme Court, the
putative father constitutionally can be denied a legitimation decree even if
he possesses uncontested proof of paternity.
Based on the Supreme Court's Caban decision, however, section 13.21
denies the putative father equal protection because he is treated differently
(K) executed before or after the suit is filed an unrevoked or irrevocable
affidavit of relinquishment of parental rights as provided by Section 15.03 of
this code; and in addition, the court further finds that
(2) termination is in the best interest of the child.
136. Id. § 11.01 (Vernon 1975) provides that a parent is a man whose child is legitimate.
By being denied voluntary legitimation under § 13.21, the putative father remains a
nonparent. Ironically, an involuntary determination of paternity under § 13.09 creates the
parent-child relationship. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 13.09 (Vernon 1975 & Supp. 1980).
137. One commentator suggests that "discretion" is often "caprice." Smith, Title 2: Par-
ent and Child, 8 TEX. TECH L. REV. 19, 71 (1976).
138. The court can make such a finding based on a general presumption of a father's
unfitness rather than a specific finding according to the criteria of§ 15.02. See In re K, 535
S.W.2d 168, 174-75 (Tex. 1976) (Pope, J., dissenting).
139. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
140. Id. at 649 (emphasis added). The holding in Stanley applies to adoption as well as
custody proceedings. See text accompanying notes 23-25 supra.
141. 535 S.W.2d 168 (Tex. 1976). The putative father had not assisted the mother after
learning of her pregnancy. Before the child's birth, he was confined to the penitentiary for
interstate transportation of a 14-year-old girl and a stolen vehicle. Id. at 168-69. After the
decision in In re K, the Texas Legislature amended § 15.02 to include § 15.02(H), which
provides that a father is unfit if he abandons the mother during pregnancy. See TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 15.02(l)(H) (Vernon Supp. 1980). This provision prevents an irresponsible
father from claiming his parental rights without the necessity of the discriminatory provision
of id. § 13.21 (b), which can deny a father with proof of paternity the right to be considered a
"parent."
142. 535 S.W.2d at 170.
143. Id. at 171.
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from the unwed mother. Under the Texas statutory scheme, an unwed
mother is a parent because of her biological relationship to her child,
whereas the father's undisputed proof of paternity does not qualify him as
a parent without the approval of a third party. Thus, the father is effec-
tively denied the opportunity to consent to his child's adoption if the court
believes the child's best interests justify denying a legitimation decree and
terminating the rights of the putative father. Addressing the issue of the
child's best interests, the Caban Court wrote:
We do not question that the best interests of such children often may
require their adoption into new families who will give them the stabil-
ity of a normal, two-parent home. Moreover, adoption will remove
the stigma under which illegitimate children suffer. But the unques-
tioned right of the State to further these desirable ends by legislation
is not in itself sufficient to justify the gender-based distinction of [the
New York statute].144
Rather, the distinction must bear a substantial relation to the state's inter-
est in providing adoptive homes. 145 The gender-based distinction in the
Texas statutory scheme does not bear such a substantial relation because it
sets up an arbitrary distinction between an unwed mother, whose rights
can be terminated and thus adoption of her child allowed only by showing
cause under section 15.02, and an unwed father whose rights can be termi-
nated at the discretion of the mother or the court. The same comment that
the United States Supreme Court made about the New York statute in
Caban applies to the Texas statute: "The effect of [the] classification is to
discriminate against unwed fathers even when their identity is known and
they have manifested a significant paternal interest in the child."'' 46
A Texas putative father also suffers discrimination under the state's
wrongful death statute.' 47 Although the Parham court upheld the statu-
tory distinction that denied the putative father a wrongful death action, the
Court emphasized that the natural father could have recovered if he had
legitimated the child. Significantly, the Georgia legitimation statute does
not require the specific consent of the mother or the court before a legiti-
mation decree can be granted to the father. 148 The relevant Texas statute
allows a "parent" of the deceased child to institute a wrongful death ac-
tion. 149 Because section 13.21 can operate to deny a putative father the
144. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 391 (1979). Justice Stewart in his dissent in
Caban maintained that the Court's decision ignored the rights of the illegitimate child who,
being denied adoptive parents, remained illegitimate. Id. at 400 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
145. 441 U.S. at 391.
146. Id. at 394. Justice Powell commented that Caban was powerless to remove himself
from the statutory burden, regardless of proof of paternity, because he could not legitimate
his child. The Texas statute provides for legitimation, but disallows absolute, undisputed
proof of paternity to establish the rights of a "parent."
147. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4675 (Vernon 1975).
148. GA. CODE ANN. § 74-103 (1973).
149. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4675 (Vernon 1975) (emphasis added) provides:
Actions for damage arising from death shall be for the sole and exclusive ben-
efit of and may be brought by the surviving husband, wife, children, and par-
ents of the person whose death has been caused or by either of them for the
benefit of all. If none of said parties commence such action within three cal-
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rights of a parent, even when he is legally identified as the father of the
child, he is arguably denied equal protection by the combined operation of
the Texas wrongful death statute and section 13.21. In contrast, fathers of
legitimate children and unwed mothers are considered parents eligible to
bring suit for the death of a child without having to meet the strict legiti-
mation requirements imposed upon putative fathers.
V. CONCLUSION
Although the Supreme Court's decision in Kahn reflected an unwilling-
ness to confront squarely a statute's sex discrimination against a male, the
Craig decision and the recent Orr opinion demonstrated the Court's rec-
ognition that equal protection means equal treatment of both sexes. The
plurality in Parham, -however, retreated in its equal protection approach to
gender discrimination by articulating a threshold test requiring the pres-
ence of invidious discrimination before a statute that seems clearly based
on gender must meet the substantial relationship test established in Craig.
Apparently, if the four members of the plurality can discover any constitu-
.tionally cognizable 'difference between men and women upon which a
challenged statute is based, they will apply the rational basis test, and the
statute will thus be upheld. The only difference between the father and
mother in Parham resulted from a statutory provision that required puta-
tive fathers, but not mothers, to legitimate their children, certainly not a
significant inherent distinction between men and women. Because the
gender discrimination at issue in Parham involved fathers of illegitimate
children, the plurality may have enunciated this threshold test to avoid
confronting, whenever possible, the complex issues involved in granting
equal protection to the putative father. If these Justices continue to apply
the threshold test to all statutes as clearly based on gender as that in
Parham, however, the effect will be, in many instances, an abdication of
the heightened scrutiny of the intermediate standard set out in Craig as
well as further confusion in the somewhat unsettled three-tiered approach
to equal protection analysis.
Even if the majority had applied the substantial relationship test in both
Parham and Caban, Justice Powell's opinions in these cases suggest that a
putative father's claim for equal protection may be granted if it involves a
personal relationship with his child, but denied if it is based on an eco-
nomic interest arising after the child's death. The substantial relationship
standard does provide a less rigid approach than that previously used in
the two-tiered model, but it allows significant subjectivity in the analysis as
suggested by Justice Powell's inconsistent opinions in Parham and Caban.
Caban does expand the putative father's rights in the area of adoption
endar months after the death of the deceased, the executor or administrator of
the deceased shall commence and prosecute the action unless requested by all
of such parties not to prosecute the same. The amount recovered shall not be
liable for the debts of the deceased.
A putative father is a parent only if he has legitimated the child. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 11.01(3) (Vernon 1975).
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and will significantly affect state laws such as those in Texas that operate to
deny the father a voice in the future of his illegitimate child. The Texas
statutory scheme clearly discriminates against unwed fathers on the basis
of their sex because an unwed mother becomes a parent as a result of her
biological relationship whereas a father may be denied his parenthood
even when his paternity is undisputed. Furthermore, an unwed mother's
rights regarding her child can only be terminated by specific proof that she
is unfit, while a father may lose his child at the discretion of the mother or
the court. This distinction based merely on the sex of the parent meets
even the threshold requirement set out by Justice Stewart in Parham.
Because of the threshold test enunciated in Parham, equal protection
review of gender-based statutes may be less rigorous in those instances
when the four Parham Justices initially find no invidious discrimination
than it would be if they maintained the Craig standard for all gender dis-
crimination. Unless the Court uses the substantial relationship test for all
gender discrimination, and unless it sharpens the analytical components of
the intermediate standard, the putative father will continue to receive
equal protection only on an ad hoc basis.
